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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is a consolidated medical indigency case under Chapter 35, Title 31 of the Idaho
Code. Appellant, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus), appealed the
decisions of the Board of County Commissioners for Elmore County ("Board" or "Elmore
County") to deny two third-party applications for county assistance that were not signed by
either patient. Elmore County determined that they were incomplete without their signatures.
Saint Alphonsus timely filed Petitions for Review ("Petitions") to the district court. The district
court upheld the denials. Saint Alphonsus appeals from the district court's determination.
B.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

The two cases (hereinafter identified as "T.O." and "T.A.", based upon the initials of the
patients' names) have been consolidated as the issues on appeal are identical. Saint Alphonsus
submitted a Combined Application for State and County Medical Assistance ("Application") for
T.O. on January 7, 2013. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Clerk's Record for K-01-13-07
filed on September 10, 2013 (hereinafter "T.O. R."), at 2-13.)

Saint Alphonsus filed the

Application for T.O. as a "third party applicant", because the patient refused to sign the
Application.

(See T.O. R. at 173 ,i 14; Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Transcript of the

Indigency Reconsideration held on June 17, 2013, before the Elmore County Board of
Commissioners for K-01-13-07 filed on September 10, 2013 (hereinafter "T.O. Transcript"), p.
12:10-15.) The Application included a cover-sheet requesting services, information including
diagnosis and requests for services, signatures by Saint Alphonsus's representative, Cassie
Olson, and personal information. (T.O. R. at 2-13.) Because the patient refused to sign the
Application, the releases and the rights and responsibilities section of the Application for the
patient were not signed. (Id.)
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Saint Alphonsus submitted an Application for T.A. on March 14, 2013. (See Clerk's
Certificate of Exhibits, Clerk's Record for K-03-13-08 filed on September 10, 2013 (hereinafter
"T.A. R."), at 2-12.) This Application was also filed as a "third party applicant", because the
patient refused to sign the Application. (See T.A. R. at 118 ,I 13.) As with the T.O. Application,
the T.A. Application included a cover-sheet requesting services, information including diagnosis
and requests for services, signatures by Saint Alphonsus's representative, Rayven Wilkerson, and
personal information. (Id) Because the patient refused to sign the Application, the releases and
rights and responsibilities section of the Application for the patient were not signed. (Id.)
The Board issued initial determinations of denial for both Applications. (T.O. R. at 4448; T.A. R. at 31-35.) The basis for the denials was the Board's belief that neither application
was a completed application pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3502(7). 1

(Id.)

With T.O.'s

Application, even though the Board noted it was filed as a third party application, it was
incomplete because it had "no signatures or releases" and "pages 8 & 9 [were] not signed per
Idaho Code" by the patient.

(T.O. R. at 47.)

The same decision was reached for T.A.'s

Application. (T.A. R. at 34.) Both decisions were timely appealed by Saint Alphonsus. (T.O. R.
at 49; T.A. R. at 37.)
The Board issued notices of hearing on May 9, 2013. (T.O. R. at 58; T.A. R. at 38.)
Both notices of hearing contained the following statement:
A completed application meeting the requirements of Idaho Code § 31-3502(7)
was not filed within thirty-one days as required by Idaho Code § 31-3 505(2) and
as such was denied by the Board of County Commissioners. At or prior to the
foregoing hearing, written evidence or testimony will only be permitted

1

The definition is as follows: "Completed application" shall include at a
minimum the cover sheet requesting services, applicant information including diagnosis
and requests for services and signatures, personal information of the applicant, patient
rights and responsibilities, releases and all other signatures required in the application.
2

concemmg whether the application was a completed application under the
forgoing statutes.
(T.O. R. at 58; T.A. R. at 38.) Neither patient appeared at their appeal hearings on May 9, 2013.
(See generally T.O. Transcript; Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Transcript of the Indigency

Reconsideration held on June 17, 2013, before the Elmore County Board of Commissioners for
K-01-13-08 filed on September 10, 2013 (hereinafter "T.A. Transcript").)

After hearing

argument and testimony at the appeal hearings, the Board issued Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law on July 8, 2013, upholding the initial denials on its belief that neither
Application was a completed application pursuant to Idaho Code§ 31-3502(7). (T.O. R. at 16778; T.A. R. at 115-23.)

With regard to T.O.'s Application, the Board determined that the

Application did not contain the signature of the applicant on "(i) the Application (page 1); (ii) the
patient rights and responsibilities section of the Application (page 9); and (iii) the Release of
Information section of the Application (page 10)." (T.O. R. at 172 ,I 13.) The Board also
believed the Application was incomplete regarding the residency of the applicant, the applicant's
phone number and financial information other than listings of "No" "unknown" and "n/a." (Id.)
The findings relating to T.A. 's Application were virtually the same. (T.A. R. at 118 ,I 12.)
Saint Alphonsus filed petitions for judicial review on August 1, 2013. The Petitions
sought review of the Board's decision to deny the Applications, contending that it was error for
the Board to find that neither Application was a completed application under Chapter 35, Title
31, Idaho Code. The matter was fully briefed to the District Court and a hearing before the
District Court was held on February 21, 2014.

The District Court issued a memorandum

decision and order on April 11, 2014, upholding the Board's final determinations.

Saint

Alphonsus filed its Notice of Appeal on May 23, 2014, from the district court's decision, seeking
appellate review of the district court's decision.

3

II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the applications were "completed applications" under Chapter 35, Title 31,
Idaho Code.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIE\V

The denial of an application for indigency benefits is reviewed under the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA"). See Idaho Code § 31-3505G; In re Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495, 496,
903 P.2d 84, 85 (1995). Under the APA, judicial review of an administrative order is limited to
the record before the agency, in this case the Board. Shobe v. Ada County, 130 Idaho 580, 583,
944 P.2d 715, 718 (1997).

This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board on

questions of fact, and it must uphold the Board's findings of fact "if supported by substantial and

competent evidence. Id. (emphasis added). However, this Court is free to correct errors of law.
Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Payette County, 128 Idaho 517,519,915 P.2d 1375,
1377 (Ct. App. 1996).
Under the APA, this Court shall affirm the Board's action unless the Court finds that the
Board's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are "(a) in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the [Board]; (c) made upon
unlawful procedures; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Idaho Code§ 67-5279(2).
Idaho law requires the Court to review the Board's decision under the substantial
evidence standard, to conduct "a serious review [of the record] which goes beyond the mere
ascertainment of procedural regularity." Local 1494 of Int 'l Ass 'n of Firefighters v. City of

Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 633, 586 P.2d 1346, 1349 (1978). To determine whether there is
substantial evidence supporting the Board's findings, the Court must review the whole record,

4

including evidence contrary to the Board's decision. See, id., 99 Idaho at 634, 586 P.2d at 1350.
"The substantial evidence rule requires the reviewing court to determine whether the agency's
findings of fact are 'reasonable."' Sacred Heart lvfed. Ctr. v. Kootenai County Comm 'rs, 136
Idaho 787, 790, 41 P.3d 215, 218 (2001). The court must look at the evidence considered by the
agency to determine whether the findings are reasonable. Id.
In a case such as this, where the Board is an elected body "which must occasionally serve
in the combined roles of complainant, prosecutor and judge and which [has] daily familiarity
with the parties to a dispute," the Idaho Supreme Court permits a particularly searching review of
the Board's decisions. Local 1494, 99 Idaho at 635, 586 P.2d at 1351. \Vhile there is "nothing
constitutionally impermissible" about an elected body serving in such a role, this Court must
remain cognizant of the Board's position and its conflict between fair and correct application of
the law and its desire to protect the taxpayer's dollars. Id. Because of the Board's position as an
elected body, its "final adjudication often lacks that stamp of impartiality and of disinterested
justice which alone can give it ,veight and authority." Id.

In reviewing such decisions, this

Court should "zealously examine the record with the view to protecting the fundamental rights of
the parties." Id. If the Board's action is not affirmed, this Court must set it aside in whole or in
part and, only if necessary, remand the matter for further proceedings by the Board. Idaho
Code§ 67-5279(3).

IV.

ARGUMENT

The Board and District Court determined that the Applications were not completed
applications pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3 502(7). However, in reaching these determinations,
the Board and District Court failed to recognize established legal precedent and to follow rules of
statutory construction, which establish that the Applications were properly made as third party
applications. In reaching its decision, the District Court failed to consider clearly expressed
5

legislative intent and decades of authority relating to third party applicants. One of the primary
purposes for enacting the Medical Indigency Act (Idaho Code §§ 31-350

8) is to ensure that

hospitals would not be required to subsidize and shoulder the cost of medical care of the
counties' indigent residents, but instead would receive compensation for their services. As a
result, denying the medical provider the ability to file and pursue an application for county
assistance where the patient refuses to sign an application and cooperate runs counter to this
pnmary purpose.

The District Court's determination also fails to reconcile with the entire

statutory framework of the Medical Indigency Act and disregards Idaho precedent that speaks to
the contrary. For these reasons, the District Court's determinations were erroneous and should
be overturned.
A.

The District Court's Ruling is Contrary to the Plain Meaning of the Code
and Expressed Legislative Intent

The District Court's determination disregarded several decades' worth of Idaho
precedent. In fact, it failed to consider the history of the Medical Indigency Act, changes to it
and its legislative purpose. (R. at 59.) It was error to do so. In discussing the standard of review
regarding the interpretation of a statute, which happens to be the same at-issue statute, the Idaho
Supreme Court has held the following:
This Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the
facts. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). The
primary function of the Court is to determine and give effect to the legislative
intent. Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue.
George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385,
1387-88 (1990).
If the statutory language is unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to
consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property Owners Assn. v.
Board of Commrs. of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483
(1999). The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly
expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd
results. Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264,266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004).
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When a statute is ambiguous, the determination of the meaning of the statute and
its application is also a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595
(2000); JR. Simplot Co. v. if7estern Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977
P .2d 196, 198 (1999). If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, the
Court will attempt to ascertain legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may
examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations,
and the policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. at 134, 997 P.2d at 595.
To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the
statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind
the statute, and its legislative history. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No.
84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006).
St. Luke's Reg'! ~Med'! Ctr, Ltdv. Bd. ofCom'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753,755,203 P.3d

683, 685 (2009).
1.

Saint Alphonsus Has a Clearly Recognized Right to File and Pursue Third
Party Applications Under Chapter 35, Title 31. Idaho Code.

Third party applicants have a clearly recognized right in the Code to file and pursue third
party applications where patients refuse to cooperate. See St. Luke's Reg'! Med'! Ctr. v. Bd. of
Comm 'rs ofAda County, 146 Idaho 753,203 P.3d 683 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'! lvfed'l Ctr.
v. Ada County et al., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009); Univ. of Utah Hospital v.
Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). In the two

2009 Idaho Supreme Court cases, the County asserted that a provider such as Saint Alphonsus
did not have standing to request judicial review of a board of county commissioners' decision to
deny a medical indigency application. St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 754, 203 P.3d at 684; Saint
Alphonsus, 146 Idaho at 863, 204 P.3d at 503. The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately disagreed

with the County and found that providers such as Saint Alphonsus and St. Luke's are real parties
in interest and have standing to seek judicial review under Chapter 35, Title 31. St. Luke's, 146
Idaho at 759; Saint Alphonsus, 146 Idaho at 863.

7

In St. Luke's, the County argued that the 1996 amendments to the Medical Indigency Act
had overturned the rulings of Cmpenter v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575, 691 P.3d 1190
(1984 ), and Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of County Cmnm 'rs of Blaine County, l 09
Idaho 299, 707 P.2d 410 (1985). St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 758-59, 203 P.3d at 687-88. In both of
those cases, the Idaho Supreme Court had ruled that providers had standing to seek judicial
review of adverse county board decisions based on providers' expectation of compensation for
medical care of indigents under the Medical Indigency Act.

Id. at 756, 203 P.3d at 686.

However, the legislature amended the Medical Indigency Act in 1996 augmenting the statutory
language and adding to the defined terms:
Idaho Code § 31-3505 was amended to provide that a "third party making
application on the applicant's behalf' had the right to petition for judicial review
in addition to an applicant. Idaho Code§ 31-3505G. The definitions section of
Idaho Code § 31-3502 was expanded to include definitions for the terms
"applicant"," "third party applicant," and "provider" among others. 1996 Idaho
Session Laws, Ch. 410, p. 1357.

Id. at 757,203 P.3d at 687. 2 Ada County had argued the following:
Essentially, Ada County urges that the legislature intended to make a subtraction
by addition when it amended Idaho Code § 31-3505G. That is, by adding
definitions and the term "third parties making application on the applicant's
behalf," the legislature intended to subtract providers from the group of parties
that traditionally have standing to seek judicial review of medical indigency
decisions made by a county's board of commissioners. According to Ada County,
the omission of providers from the language of Idaho Code § 31-3 505G manifests
such intent.

Id. at 758,203 P.3d at 688. The Idaho Supreme Court found the arguments unconvincing:

Idaho Code § 3 l-3505G had provided as follows: "If, after the hearing as provided in
section 31-3505E, Idaho Code, the final determination of the board is to deny an application for
financial assistance with necessary medical services, the applicant, or a third party making
application on an applicant's behalf, may seek judicial review of the final determination of the
board in the manner provided in section 31-1506, Idaho Code." Id. at 756,203 P.3d at 686.
2
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Ada County's argument is unconvincing. In discussing rules of statutory
construction, this Court in Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d
951 (2003), recognized that some terms and phrases have developed specific
meanings or subtexts resulting from years of consistent judicial interpretation and
"[t]his Court assumes the Legislature has full knowledge of this existing judicial
interpretation when it amends a statute." 139 Idaho at 212, 76 P.3d at 956
(quoting State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063
(Ct.App.1995)). Furthermore, in George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118
Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990), this Court held "[t]he legislature is
presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an
intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language
employed admits of no other construction." Here, there is no express declaration
or language that offers an unequivocal construction that the legislature intended to
overturn the long established principle that providers have standing to seek review
of adverse board decisions. If the legislature had intended to deny providers
standing and to overturn Carpenter and lntermountain Health Care IL it could
have simply added the clause "providers have no standing to seek judicial review"
into the statute. It clearly did not.
It is more likely the legislature, assumed under Seward to be aware of the
precedent granting providers standing, simply did not see the need to codify what
was already well established and accepted as the law-that providers have
standing to seek judicial review of adverse decisions of a county board. While
Carpenter and lntermountain Health Care II grant standing to providers with
pecuniary expectations, it did not extend to third party applicants under the
holdings. This explains the need to amend Idaho Code § 31-3505G to include
third party applicants, and why it was not necessary to include a reference to
providers in the amendment. Ada County's argument leads to absurd results
which are contrary to the expressed legislative intent. Gillihan v. Gump, l 40
Idaho at 266, 92 P .3d at 516. As stated above, the intent behind the Medical
Indigency Act is two-fold, to assure medical care for indigents and to allow
hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents. University of
Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154,
1156 (2007). Precluding providers from relief through review in the district court
frustrates the second prong of the legislative intent.

Id. at 758, 203 P.3d at 688. 3
Saint Alphonsus is a real party in interest in matters brought under the Medical Indigency
Act. Id. at 756, 203 P.3d at 686. As such, it is "entitled to make an application for medical
The full citations to Carpenter and lntermountain Health Care II are as follows:
Carpenter v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575, 691 P.2d 1190 (1984), and Intermountain
Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm 's of Blaine County, 109 Idaho 299, 707 P.2d 410
(1985).
3
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indigency benefits on behalf of the person to whom emergency medical services were provided,
entitled to pursue such benefits by appeal, and entitled to receipt of the County's payment." Id.
Moreover, it may file third party applications when the patient fails to sign an application and
cooperate, such as the patients in the present appeal. Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd.

of Comm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007).

Accordingly, Saint

Alphonsus may file third party applications and pursue the application through appeal to a board
of county commissioners and through appeal to the courts and may do so even when patients fail
to cooperate.
2.

Applications for County Assistance Are Uniform and Created by the Idaho
Department of Health & Welfare.

The Code mandates that the application form for county assistance, including the at-issue
Applications, be created by the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare:
(2) "Application" means the combined application for state and county medical
assistance pursuant to sections 31-3504 and 31-3503E, Idaho Code. In this
chapter an application for state and county medical assistance shall also mean an
application for financial assistance.
Idaho Code § 31-3 502(2).

One of the powers and duties of the Department of Health and

Welfare 4 was to develop the form of Applications:
31-3503C. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT. The department
shall:

(4) Develop and implement by July 1, 2010, in cooperation with the Idaho
association of counties and the Idaho hospital association, a uniform form to be
used for both the initial review, pursuant to section 31-3503E, Idaho Code, and
the application for financial assistance pursuant to section 31-3 504, Idaho Code.

4

As used in the Code, the "Department" means the department of health and welfare.
Idaho Code § 31-3502(10).
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Idaho Code § 3 l-3503C(4). Elmore County corroborated this fact at the appeal hearing in front
the Elmore County Board of Commissioners. Transcript, p. 22, 11. 12-23. IDHW therefore
determined the form of the Applications at issue and identified therein where and when a third
party applicant such as Saint Alphonsus was to sign the Applications. Accordingly, no other
form application can be filed for County assistance and any additions to an Application not
approved by IDHW would not comply with the Code. As discussed below, this is critical, in that
the District Court's decisions improperly demanded Application submissions by Saint Alphonsus
neither required by nor delineated within the standard IDHW fonn Application.
3.

As a Third Party Applicant Saint Alphonsus Completed All of the Areas
That It Was Required to Fill for the Third Partv Application.

Simply stated, Saint Alphonsus completed all of the areas that it was required to fill out
as a third party applicant. However, the Board and District Court refused to follow the precedent
of St. Luke's and Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808,811, 153
P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007), when they determined that the Applications in this matter were
somehow not "completed applications". (See T.O. R. at 172

i1 13; T.A. R. at 118 ii 12.) Much

like Ada County in St. Luke's, the Board cited an amendment in 2011 to the definitions in the
Medical Indigency Act to justify its decision to deny the Applications as incomplete applications.
The District Court erroneously upheld this determination.
In 2011, the Idaho legislature amended the Code in the following areas 5 :
(2) "Application" means an the combined application for financial state and
county medical assistance pursuant to sections 31-3504 and 31-3503E, Idaho
Code, and the uniform form used for the initial reviev,z and the department's
medicaid eligibility determination described in section 31 3503C(4), Idaho Code.
In this chapter an application for state and county medical assistance shall also
mean an application for financial assistance.

5

Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by ~ - Vetoes are indicated by Text ;
stricken material by Text.
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(7) "Completed application" shall include at a m1mmum the cover sheet
requesting services, applicant information including diagnosis and requests for
services and signatures, personal information of the applicant, patient rights and
responsibilities, releases and all other signatures required in the application.
2011 Idaho Laws, Ch. 291 (H.B. 310). 6 The definitions of "Applicant", "Obligated person" and
"Third Party Applicant" have not changed and are provided below for ease of reference. (Id.)
(1) "Applicant" means any person who is requesting financial assistance under
this chapter.
(19) "Obligated person" means the person or persons who are legally responsible
for an applicant including, but not limited to, parents of minors or dependents.
(26) "Third party applicant" means a person other than an obligated person who
completes, signs and files an application on behalf of a patient. A third party
applicant who files an application on behalf of a patient pursuant to section 313504, Idaho Code, shall, if possible, deliver a copy of the application to the
patient within three (3) business days after filing the application.
Idaho Code § 31-3502(1 ), (19), (26). The third party applicant, to the extent it has knowledge,
has a duty to cooperate with the county clerk in investigating, providing documentation,
submitting to an interview and ascertaining eligibility. Idaho Code § 31-3505A(2).
Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) provides none of the specificity that the District Court and the
County insists is required. Idaho Code § 31-3 502(7) does not say that the cover sheet or the first
page of an Application has to be signed.

It does not say that the patient rights and

The Medical Indigency Act was also amended on July 1, 2013, between the appeal
hearing date and date in which the County issued its Final Determination. It changed the
definition of "Completed application" as follows: (7) "Completed application" shall include at a
minimum the cover sheet requesting services, applicant information including diagnosis and
requests for services and signatures, personal and financial information of the applicant and
obligated person or persons, patient rights and responsibilities, releases and all other signatures
required in the application." 2013 Idaho Laws, Ch. 279 (H.B. 98). However, the amendment
has no bearing on the appeal since Idaho laws are not applied retroactively and there is no
expression to the otherwise regarding the amendments to the Code. See Idaho Code § 73-101;
see generally Idaho Code§ 31-3501 et seq. The Court is to consider the Code as it existed at the
time an application for county assistance is filed. St. Luke's Magic Valley Med'! Ctr. Ltd. v. Bd.
of County Com 'rs of Gooding County, 150 Idaho 484,488,248 P.3d 735, 739(2011).
6
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responsibilities or releases need to be signed. While it contains the oblique statement that the
applications contain "all other signatures required in the application," it does not specify who
needs to sign and where. (Id.)

As noted above, those specific determinations have been

legislatively assigned to IDHW to make; in tum, IDHW has determined what signatures would
be required in the Application and where they would be necessary. For the reasons discussed
immediately below, Saint Alphonsus appropriately signed all the areas it was required to sign as
a third party applicant on the standard IDHW form application.
In the present matter, Saint Alphonsus provided the as-required cover-sheet. (See T.O. R.
at 2-11; T.A. R. at 2-12.) Again, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) does not state that the third party
applicant needs to sign the cover-sheet; it only states that a "cover sheet requesting services" be
provided. However, the uniform form requires the signature of an authorized representative and
immediately above that signature, it provides as follows:
By signing below and requesting a Medicaid eligibility determination under the
Medically Indigent Program, county/hospital accepts and acknowledges that they
have read, understand, and will comply with the rules promulgated by the
Department of Health & Welfare and the Board of the Catastrophic Health Care
Cost Program, pursuant to Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code.
(T.O. R. at 2; T.A. R. at 2.) Both areas were signed by a Saint Alphonsus representative. (Id.)
Both Applications also appropriately provided the known personal information pertaining
to the patients, which the District Court agreed with. (See T.O. R. at 2-11; T.A. R. at 2-12; R. at
59-60.)
The remammg issue 1s whether the appropriate signatures were provided in the
appropriate places for a third party application. Saint Alphonsus submits that it provided the
appropriate signatures in the appropriate places.

13

The first page of the application does not provide a space for a third party applicant to
sign. (T.O. R. at 3; T.A. Rat 3.) Idaho Code§ 31-3502(7) does not state that the first page of
the application needs to be signed. Accordingly, as the uniform form provided by IDHW
determines who is to sign the first page, the onlv space requiring a signature is the applicant or
co-applicant. (Id.) As made clear above, the terms "applicant" and "third party applicant" have
specific definitions and they are not the same, but the District Court overlooked this. (R. at 60.)
The District Court failed to appreciate that Idaho Code § 31-3504 does not require both the
patient and third party applicant's signatures on an application. (Id.) This is because the District
Court erroneously read Idaho Code § 31-3504(2) to require both an applicant and third party
applicant's signatures, when, instead, Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) makes it clear that both are not
required. (Id.) This is made amply clear in the following provision through the use of "or":
"The completed application shall be signed by the applicant or third party applicant, an
authorized representative of the applicant, QI, if the applicant is incompetent or incapacitated,
someone acting responsibly for the applicant and filed in the clerk's office." Idaho Code § 313 504(1 )( emphasis added). This argument also applies to the Patient Rights and Responsibilities
page and the Release page discussed below. Moreover, while the District Court was critical of
the third party applicant not signing the acknowledgment on the first page (see R. at 60), it is
virtually the same acknowledgment found on the previous page (cover sheet), which was signed
and acknowledged by the third party applicant in both instances. (T.O. R. at 2-3; T.A. R. at 2-3.)
Therefore, because IDHW deemed that only the "applicant" or "co-applicant" needed to sign the
first page of an application and not the "third party applicant", Saint Alphonsus did not fail to
comply with any statutory requirements as argued by the County or as determined by the District
Court in not signing the first page.
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The ninth page of the application is titled "Patient Rights and Responsibilities for State
and County Assistance". (T.O. R. at 12; T.A. R. at 11.) Notably, it is phrased as the "Patient's"
rights and responsibilities and not the "third party applicant's" rights and responsibilities. (Id.)
In fact, all of the rights and responsibilities are phrased to apply to the patient or applicant and
not a third party applicant such as Saint Alphonsus. (See, e.g., "If I receive Medicaid after age
55, my estate may be subject to recovery of medical expenses paid on my behalf, and that any
transfer of assets may be set aside by a court ifl do not receive adequate value." T.O. R. at 12.)
Again, Idaho Code § 31-3 504( 1) makes it clear that signatures for both a patient and third party
applicant are not required; only one of them is.

Accordingly, it is nonsensical for Saint

Alphonsus to initial and sign the rights and responsibilities when they are those of the patient or
applicant or co-applicant, and especially where Saint Alphonsus' initials/signature would have
little, if any, value, given that Saint Alphonsus lacks any representative authority to complete
such document and make it binding upon the patient. However, it does make sense for a third
party applicant to sign this page at the bottom, because it is the last page of the application prior
to the "release of information". Since a third party applicant cannot sign a release of information
for a patient, IDHW determined that the third paiiy applicant needed to sign the application and
chose this space for the third party applicant to do so. Again, under the Code, Saint Alphonsus is
required to submit a uniform application that has been approved by IDHW. Accordingly, the
form directs whose signature is required and where. Saint Alphonsus complied with the Code by
signing on the bottom of the page as third party applicant.
The tenth page of the application is a "release of information". (T.O. R. at 13; T.A. R. at
12.) The District Court found that T.O. refused to sign the release and that the T.A. application
lacked the release required by Idaho Code § 31-3502(7). (R. at 61.) As with the first page of the
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application, the only space requiring a signature is for the patient, applicant, or co-applicant.
(Id.) Again, this is a uniform application, and because IDHW did not provide a space for the

third party to sign it, it deemed that a third party applicant's signature was unnecessary. Saint
Alphonsus did not fail to comply with any statutory requirements as argued by the County.
Moreover, the release is specific to the patient/applicant and Saint Alphonsus has no authority to
sign it. This is made clear at the very top of the release where it specifies who is making the
release: the patient, applicant and co-applicant if applicable. (Id.)
Finally, the District Court also inappropriately made findings of fact when it determined
that the truth of the matters contained in the Applications were not sworn per Idaho Code § 313504. 7 See R. at 61; Mercy Med'! Ctr. v. Ada Cty, Bd. ofCty Comm 'rs, 146 Idaho 226,232, 192
P.3d 1050, 1056 (2008)(holding that when a board fails to make a factual determination on a
necessary issue, the district court must not make its own factual determination). This is because
the Board did not make such factual determinations. (T.O. R. at 172-73

,i,r 13-15; T.A.

R. at

117-119 ,r,r 12-14.) In any event, the District Court's determination on this issue was in error. It
fails to explain how and when the application should be sworn, when no such "swearing"
requirement is called for from a third-party applicant in the standard IDHW form application. It
certainly can be done during an interview, or even at an appeal hearing as the Idaho Supreme
Court noted in Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd. ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12,
153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). 8 Perhaps the most glaring fault in the Court's determination is

Idaho Code § 31-3504, in relevant part, provides that "[t]he truth of the matters
contained in the completed application shall be sworn to by the applicant or third party
applicant."
7

8

Notably, there is no enunciated requirement that an application itself be "sworn" as a
prerequisite of being a "completed application" in the statutory definition of same, Idaho Code §
31-3502(7). Indeed, the statutory provision itself contemplates that an application be already
"complete" before being sworn to. Idaho Code§ 31-3504 ("The truth of the matters contained in
16

that the form of IDHW's applications themselves do not specify where the Applications should
be sworn. There is simply no area specified in the Application for the patient, applicant, coapplicant or third party applicant to swear to the truth of the matter asserted.
repeatedly mentioned, this is a uniform form developed by IDHW.

Again, as

It is the only application

form that can be filed for purposes of initiating Medical Indigency eligibility. Accordingly,
IDHW determined that signing the applications where designated sufficiently complied with the
Code's requirements for making an application complete. As 31-day applications, both
applications at issue were required to additionally be filed with IDHW itself. See Idaho Code §§
31-3503E(l) & 31-3504(1). Nothing in the records reflect any rejection of the applications at
issue by IDHW for alleged 'incompletion,' demonstrating that the County, Board, and District
Court's rejection of the applications is even wholly consistent with IDHW's own evaluation of
the applications completed on IDHW's own standard application form. (See generally T.O. R. at
14-15 and T.A. R. at 13-14.) Any argument by the County or the Idaho Association of Counties
to the contrary should be waived as a result. The Applications were complete.
In light of all of the above reasons, the Applications are complete applications both under
Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) and Idaho Code § 31-3504(2), and the District Court erred in finding
otherwise.
4.

The District Court's Determination 1s Contrary to Clearly Expressed
Legislative Intent.

The decisions of the Board and District Court are squarely counter to the general intent of
the Medical Indigency Act, which, in part, is to allow providers to obtain compensation for

the completed application
applicant.")( emphasis added).

shall

be

sworn
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to

by

the

applicant

or

third

party

services rendered to indigents. The Legislature's general intent or policy behind enacting the
medical indigency statutes is expressed in Idaho Code § 31-3501:
31-3501. DECLARATION OF POLICY. (1) It is the policy of this state that each
person, to the maximum extent possible, is responsible for his or her own medical
care and that of his or her dependents and to that end, shall be encouraged to
purchase his or her own medical insurance with coverage sufficient to prevent
them from needing to request assistance pursuant to this chapter. However, in
order to safeguard the public health, safety and welfare, and to provide suitable
facilities and provisions for the care and hospitalization of persons in this state,
and, in the case of medically indigent residents, to provide for the payment
thereof, the respective counties of this state, and the board and the department
shall have the duties and powers as hereinafter provided.
Idaho Code§ 31-3501(1). To help with this duty, the counties were given the jurisdiction and
power "to provide county hospitals and public general hospitals for the county and others who
are sick, injured, maimed, aged ... and to erect, enlarge, purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire,
and to officer, maintain and improve hospitals, hospital grounds .... " Idaho Code§ 31-3503(4).
Elmore County has chosen not to erect or purchase its own hospital to care for its
medically indigent residents. Instead, it has chosen to provide compensation to providers, such
as Saint Alphonsus, albeit at the statutory Medicaid reimbursement rate. See Idaho Code § 313508.

As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, the legislature was cognizant of the

arrangement between county and hospital: "the Legislature's general intent in enacting the
medical indigency assistance statutes was two-fold: to provide indigents with access to medical
care and to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents."

University of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Board of Commissioners, 143 Idaho 808, 811, 153
P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has also
stated that a provider's right to payment for medical services rendered is independent of the
applicant: "In keeping with the second prong of this policy, we have held that a patient's refusal

18

to cooperate under the medical indigency statutes does not terminate a provider's right to seek
payment." Id.

Therefore, the Board and District Court's construction of Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) in a
narrow and confined fashion is squarely at odds with the general intent of the Legislature, which
is clearly expressed in Idaho Code§ 31-3501, and this Court's own interpretive case law thereof.
The determination undercuts the very core of the Medical Indigency Act and is contrary to the
general intent of the Legislature clearly expressed therein.

The Legislature was sensitive to a

provider's right to seek payment for medical services provided to indigent persons, and thus
afforded a provider the right to seek and receive payment.

The Court has spoken on the

importance of this right and not in a manner that supports the district court's determination: "if a
provider bears too great a burden in proving indigency and risking nonpayment, then it 'might
reduce its ability to provide suitable hospital facilities to the public."' Univ. of Utah Hospital,
143 Idaho at 811, 153 P.3d at 1157 (citing Idaho Falls Consol. Hasps., Inc. v. Bd. of County

Comm'rs, Jefferson County, 109 Idaho 881, 883, 712 P.2d 582, 584 (1985)) (emphasis added).
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court re-affirmed this importance in 2009 when it issued the St.

Luke's decision and noted that "[ c]ertainly, the ramifications of the district court's ruling could
lead to a chilling effect on provider's willingness to provide care to indigents. This frustrates the
intent of the legislature to provide indigents with medical care." St. Luke's Reg 'l Med'! Ctr., Ltd.

v. Bd of Comm 'rs ofAda County, 146 Idaho 753,759,203 P.3d 683,689 (2009).
The ramifications of the Board's determinations are obvious. T.O. and T.A. appear to be
Elmore County residents, yet because they refused to cooperate and sign the applications,
Elmore County has denied Saint Alphonsus of its right to seek payment under the Medical
Indigency Act, irrespective of the fact that Saint Alphonsus took all steps necessary to complete
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the applications as a third-party applicant. Under the Board's determination-and the District
Court's affirmation thereof-whenever Saint Alphonsus provides a medically indigent Elmore
County resident medical services, the patient could refuse to sign and cooperate and Saint
Alphonsus would be wholly precluded from seeking any relief under the Medical Indigency Act,
an interpretation plainly prejudicial to Saint Alphonsus's substantial rights under the Code. The
determination by the Board (and, in tum, the District Court) therefore ignores the clearly
expressed general intent of the Legislature by favoring a narrow procedural technicality. As a
result, the Board and District Court's determination is erroneous and should be overturned.
5.

The District Court's Determination is Contrarv to Long-Established Legal
Precedent.

As demonstrated above, the filing of third party applications have long been authorized,
and the Idaho Supreme Court has held "[t]he legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn
long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express
declaration or the language employed admits of no other construction." St. Luke's, l 46 Idaho at
758,203 P.3d at 688. This case is similar to St. Luke's, because it seeks to improperly preclude a
long-held right by third party applicants to file third party applications where the patient fails to
cooperate by signing the application. 9 The Board is using the inclusion of a new definition,
Idaho Code § 31-3502(7), in the same manner that Ada County in St. Luke's sought to preclude
the appeal rights of providers through the new definition of Idaho Code § 31-3505G. The
holding and reasoning of St. Luke's therefore still apply in the present situation:

Certainly, the implicit reach of the Board's and District Court's determination is even
more far-reaching as there will certainly be patients also unable to sign (due to incapacity,
death, mental illness, etc.), the Board and District Court attempt to create a quixotic bright line
rule that would result in the automatic denial of applications submitted for such patients, merely
on the grounds that the patient did not co-sign a third-party application.
9
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"there is no express declaration or language that offers an unequivocal
construction that the legislature intended to overturn the long established principle
that providers have standing to seek review of adverse board decisions. If the
legislature had intended to deny providers standing and to overturn Carpenter and
Intermountain Health Care II, it could have simply added the clause "providers
have no standing to seek judicial review" into the statute. It clearly did not."
(Id.) Here, there is no express declaration or language that the legislature intended to overturn

long-established precedent that providers may file third party applications where the patients fail
to cooperate. If the legislature had intended to do so, it could have added a clause that "providers
have no ability to file an application where the applicant or patient refuses to sign it." It did not
do so and, hence, the Board's decision to deny the Applications as incomplete and the District
Court's determination to uphold this denial is against the plain meaning of the Medical Indigency
Act.
B.

In the Alternative, the Sections of the Medical Indigency Act Could Be
Construed as Ambiguous and the District Court's Construction of the
Statutes is Contrary to Legislative Intent

In the alternative, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) might also be construed as ambiguous when
construed against the entire Medical Indigency Act. As noted above, when construing a statute,
the Court "will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give
effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein,
lending substance and meaning to the provisions." Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428,849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993) (emphasis added).

When compared with Idaho Code § 31-3502(26), Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) can be
construed as ambiguous, because it allows third party applicants to file applications who
inherently cannot sign the application as a patient or applicant. It obviously cannot sign a release
for the patient or the rights and responsibilities for the patient. Thus, a third party application
never could be "completed," according to the Board or District Court. This plainly runs counter
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to the express language ofldaho Code § 3 l-3505A(2), which notes that third party applicants do
not have to have complete knowledge of all matters necessary to establish eligibility. It also
certainly fails to account for the clerk's mandatory duty under Idaho Code § 31-3505A(l) to
interview and investigate the information regardless as to whether the application is complete
and to inform a third party applicant such as Saint Alphonsus as to any missing information.
Finally, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) can be read to be ambiguous in failing to define "applicant
information", although it says it includes "diagnosis and requests for services and signatures".
Even then, it does not specify what signatures it is looking for. Similarly, "personal information
of the applicant" is not defined, nor are the terms "patient rights and responsibilities" and
"releases."

Critically, it does not define what are "all other signatures required in the

application." This ambiguity is highlighted by the Board's findings. It believed that the T.O.
Application was incomplete regarding the residency of the applicant, the applicant's phone
number, and financial information when it had listings of "No" "unknown" and "n/a." (T.O. R.
at 172.) The findings relating to T.A.'s Application were virtually the same. (T.A. R. at 118.)
These findings presumably go to the "personal information of the applicant" phrase within the
code section, but notably, the statute fails to specify or delineate what it means by "personal

°

information." 1 Clearly, information was provided, but, again, the statute fails to specify what is
exactly necessary to meet the requirement of "personal information."
As noted above, the decision of the Board is squarely counter to the general intent of the
Medical Indigency Act and allows a county to shirk its legal duties to provide care to its
medically indigent residents.

Rather than create the infrastructure to provide such care, the

County has elected to look to a hospital such as Saint Alphonsus.

10

Or "financial information" as amended in 2013.
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However, here, in a

convoluted game of procedural "gotcha," the County avoids any substantive consideration of the
applications, disavowing any responsibility for the services by merely citing to the lack of
signatures of its own purported citizens, despite the plain legislative authorization of third party
applications. The Legislature and Idaho Supreme Court have repeatedly recognized and been
sensitive to the plight of the hospital in a situation such as that presented before this Court. In
that situation, this Court has recognized that "if a provider bears too great a burden in proving
indigency and risking nonpavment, then it 'might reduce its ability to provide suitable hospital
facilities to the public."' Univ. of Utah Hospital, 143 Idaho at 811, 153 P.3d at 1157 (citing

Idaho Falls Consol. Hasps., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs, Jefferson County, 109 Idaho 881,
883, 712 P.2d 582, 584 (1985)) (emphasis added). In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court re-affirmed
this importance in 2009 when it issued the St. Luke's decision and noted that "[ c]ertainly, the
ramifications of the district court's ruling could lead to a chilling effect on provider's willingness
to provide care to indigents. This frustrates the intent of the legislature to provide indigents with
medical care." St. Luke's Reg'! Med'! Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho
753, 759, 203 P.3d 683, 689 (2009).
Saint Alphonsus is not asking the Court to approve both Applications. It is only asking
this Court to recognize that the decision by the Board and the District Court is contrary to longstanding and clearly expressed legislative intent and purpose.

Saint Alphonsus respectfully

requests that the Court find that the Applications here were proper third party applications, such
that said applications are appropriately investigated and determined based upon the substantive
matters at issue in a medical indigency application. Saint Alphonsus therefore requests a remand
to be given the chance to continue to pursue eligibility under the Code.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner-Appellant respectfully requests that the Board's
decision denying the medical indigency applications and the District Court's determination
upholding such denials be REVERSED and the matters REMANDED for fmiher investigation
by the County in accordance with its statutory duties under Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code.
DATED this ~~day of September, 2014.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

b rt A. Berry - Of th Firm
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
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